2011년 9월 25일 일요일

Bernanke’s Twist turns the screws on already battered U.S. pension funds


Bernanke’s Twist turns the screws on already battered U.S. pension funds

BRIAN MILNER | Columnist profile | E-mail
From Monday's Globe and Mail
When U.S. Federal Reserve chief Ben Bernanke pulled his latest confidence-restoring tonic out of his medicine bag last week, he could not have been expecting such a strongly adverse reaction from the markets, which practically choked on the stuff.
Investors simply concluded that if the Fed is desperate enough to try bringing down already ridiculously low long-term interest rates – in what one wag dubbed “Operation Twist in the Wind” – the beleaguered U.S. housing market and the broader economy must be in as bad shape as the bearish prognosticators have been telling us. And if that’s the best the U.S. central bank can do, it must really be out of ammunition.
Among those feeling the market letdown most acutely are big pension funds, which have yet to recover from the last global financial crisis and are one of the little noticed victims of the extended rock-bottom interest-rate policies of major central banks.
“Pension funds are getting badly hurt again,” says Peter Lindley, who runs the Canadian arm of State Street Global Advisors, a major institutional adviser.
Indeed, a study finds that the median U.S. corporate pension plan faces a larger funding shortfall today than in the midst of the last financial crisis in 2008-09. “I wouldn’t be surprised if many Canadian pension plans are in similar straits,” Mr. Lindley says. “That’s quite a frightening thing, because it reduces the amount of risk that they can bear.”
There was a time when pension funds and other institutional investors paid little heed to the hot air emanating from the corridors of political power. But those days are gone. It was not Europe’s festering debt crisis that combined with the latest Fed intervention to spook the markets last week. It was the continued foot-dragging and general bungling by politicians who don’t seem to grasp the painful lessons of 2008, even at this late date. The same holds true for Washington, where corralling the deficit and fixing the economy have taken a back seat to scoring ideological points.
“There’s a lot of nervousness in the markets, because we’ve moved out of the realm of what we’re used to,” says Mr. Lindley. “We can deal with a recession. We can deal with problems. But I’m not sure we can feel comfortable making investments based on what we hope or think an official may or may not do from one minute to the next. There is this massive exposure to policy right now.”
Just three months ago, “we were talking about what-if contagion,” Mr. Lindley says. And now, it’s plainly here, as illustrated by the credit downgrades of banks in France and Italy, not to mention Italy itself.
Pension managers are finding their options are becoming more limited. “You’re in a situation where you can’t take as much risk. But there’s no way to get the returns that you need either. So you’re in that chasm that’s very difficult to get out of.”
This could become a serious drag on profits, as companies are forced to pump in more capital to bring their pension funds back to solvency. The entire economy will suffer, as capital that might have gone into new investments gets diverted.
So far, most institutional investors “are still hoping to ride out the storm,” Mr. Lindley says. “The ongoing bailouts of markets by policy makers have created dependence by some investors, who, rather than adjust their investments to reflect a worsening economic situation, are waiting to be saved by some massive stimulus package.”
Yet developed economies can no longer afford such asset-inflating policies.
Meanwhile, despite the markets’ loss of faith, the policy makers are still attempting to sound the right notes. After the latest Group of 20 gabfest in Washington, they declared their commitment “to a strong and co-ordinated international response to address the renewed challenges facing the global economy.”
And the Europeans finally seem to realize that kicking the Greek can down the road is not a viable strategy. They are speeding up the timetable for recapitalizing 16 shaky banks and implementing a permanent rescue fund.
Regardless of whether these efforts calm the rattled markets, Mr. Lindley’s advice remains the same.
“We continue to advise our clients to manage their investments in line with their ability to bear risk and try to minimize any unintended risks through more closely aligning their assets and liabilities,” he says. “If you cannot afford to lose a large amount, don’t bet a large amount in risky assets.”
That sounds like a sensible approach for the rest of us, too.

Stagflation: Scourge of the ’70s stalks us still


MARKET LAB

Stagflation: Scourge of the ’70s stalks us still

From Saturday's Globe and Mail
As we teeter toward what could be the third U.S. recession in a decade, experts can’t help but sift through economic history to look for precedents. The eye is immediately drawn to the last decade of the recession trifecta – the 1970s.
That lost decade for the economy and the stock market was marked by a set of conditions so glaring that they popularized a previously obscure economic term: stagflation.
You’d think stagflation – the combination of high inflation and stagnant economic growth – would be of little help in understanding our current decade. After all, inflation rates in North America are running at a little over 3 per cent, compared with about 13 per cent at the end of the 1970s.
But veteran portfolio manager Don Coxe thinks there’s a new kind of stagflation. It may not be as dramatic as the stagflation that crippled the 1970s, but it may help explain the stalled economic and equity-market cycle.
Hello, neo-stagflation
Mr. Coxe, chairman of Coxe Advisors LLC and an adviser to BMO Nesbitt Burns, argues that while overall consumer price inflation has been fairly tame so far by historical standards, a form of “neo-stagflation” has emerged. Indeed, this trend is visible in looking at economic growth versus the inflation rate over the past several years, and has accelerated this year – inflation is clearly climbing while economic growth is stagnant.
This neo-stagflation is characterized by rising prices for food, fuel and metals – which were also key drivers in the 1970s stagflationary spiral.
“An OECD economic cycle in which prices of foods, fuels and precious metals rise far more strongly than prices of manufactured goods – or workers’ wages – is inherently stagflationary,” he wrote in a recent report. “A greater and greater share of total consumer spending goes to the commodity producers who own the farmland, the mines or the oil wells. The industrial and service-based economies find they cannot deliver the kind of strong, sustained, low-inflation economic growth that was the pattern for most of the postwar era.”
Old economy wins, innovation loses
Neo-stagflation has been evident in the stock market – not just in its lack of traction, but in the kinds of companies that have suffered and thrived over the past decade.
Mr. Coxe noted that the most valuable stock in the world in 1999 – Cisco Systems (CSCO-Q15.610.281.83%) – has been stalled for most of the past decade, despite the growth in the adoption of technology, as the profits from high-tech have been unable to compete with commodity prices. At the same time, the world’s biggest energy, mining and fertilizer stocks (Exxon Mobil, (XOM-N69.310.070.10%) BHP Billiton(BHP-N67.740.460.68%) and Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan,(POT-T47.28-0.90-1.87%) respectively) have soared. “Dull stuff is outperforming brilliantly engineered wonder products,” he said.

2011년 9월 24일 토요일

Manulife hit by falling rates, markets


Manulife hit by falling rates, markets

From Saturday's Globe and Mail
The plunges in both interest rates and stock markets this week have taken a sizable chunk out of Manulife Financial Corp.’s (MFC-T11.46-0.03-0.26%) capital, sparking calls for the insurer to sell its Canadian bank or even spin off its entire U.S. operations.
The financial crisis of 2008 showed how much falling stock markets can damage Manulife, but it has become evident that its true Achilles’ heel is falling interest rates. While “Operation Twist,” the program the U.S. Federal Reserve embarked on this week to bring down long-term interest rates, is not the fatal arrow, its impact is certain to sting.
And the lower interest rates go, the greater the impact further decreases will have. While Manulife’s capital levels are more than sufficient right now, some analysts are calling on the company to take more actions in case rates and markets fall further.
Manulife CEO Don Guloien recently said that only in an “absolutely unthinkable scenario” would Manulife’s capital levels be inadequate. “Equity markets could go to zero and if that was the only thing that happened, we wouldn’t have a problem paying all our claims, all our debt and still have a surplus left over for the shareholders,” he said at a conference last week.
But some analysts remain skeptical. “I don’t know if the market’s calling his bluff … but I thought it probably wasn’t the best choice of remarks,” said Citigroup Inc. analyst Colin Devine.
After the 2008 market freefall forced it to go hat-in-hand (twice) to investors for billions in new equity to shore up its capital levels, Manulife embarked on a program to hedge its stock market exposure. As a result, more than 60 per cent of that troublesome exposure is now protected.
Manulife also began ramping up the hedges on its interest rate exposure, but not with the same vigour. The massive decline in rates this quarter, which runs from July to September, will make a big dent in the capital levels Manulife sought to bolster in recent years. (In addition to raising equity, the company slashed its dividend in half to preserve capital.)
At the end of June, the key measure of Manulife’s capital levels, called the Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirements Ratio, stood at 241 per cent. That’s up from a low of 193 per cent in the third quarter of 2008, and 221 per cent at the end of 2007, before the crisis.
That’s comfortably above the regulatory minimum of 150 per cent, and Manulife’s own internal target, which is believed to be closer to 200 per cent.
Stock markets in Toronto and New York are down by more than 11 per cent in the past three months. Manulife estimates that a 10-per-cent drop in stock markets would take $590-million off its profits and 5 percentage points off its MCCSR ratio. (In comparison, before its hedging program kicked into high gear at the end of 2008, a 10-per-cent decline was estimated to cost $1.6-billion).
More importantly, Manulife estimates that a 100-basis-points (one percentage point) drop in interest rates would wipe $1.2-billion off its profits and 19 basis points off its MCCSR ratio.
While this environment is taking a toll on all life insurers, Manulife is one of the most sensitive to interest rates in North America, Mr. Devine said.
Many moving parts affect Manulife’s capital levels, and there are various ways it can prop up the levels, including selling bonds. This quarter, for instance, it sold a unit related to re-insurance to Pacific Life Insurance Co., adding six percentage points to its capital levels. But there is no doubt that Manulife’s MCCSR at the end of this month will be significantly below last quarter’s, likely closer to 215 or 220 per cent, most analyst say.
“We are clearly getting into a danger zone,” said Mario Mendonca, an analyst at Canaccord Genuity. “At 200 per cent, I’m sure people would be getting pretty anxious about Manulife.”
If low rates and equity markets persist in the months ahead, the company could find itself shoring up its balance sheet again. Although this time around, that’s not likely to be by issuing common equity.
For one thing, it could have trouble finding buyers, said Mr. Mendonca. The company issued equity at $19 per share in late 2009, and its stock is now trading below $12 – below its book value.
A wiser course might be to issue debt and preferred shares, said National Bank analyst Peter Routledge. But that could weigh on the insurer’s credit rating.
Mr. Devine thinks more-drastic measures are needed. He’d like to see Manulife spin off John Hancock Financial Services Inc., its U.S. business. “John Hancock is just going to tie up a lot of their capital, and produce a very low return, literally for decades to come,” he said. “This is not a problem that gets fixed in quarters or years, it will run decades because that’s the duration of their liabilities.”
To illustrate Manulife’s headaches, Mr. Devine, who is based in New York, points to the variable annuity that he himself purchased from John Hancock years ago. (Variable annuities, which are essentially pension plans for individual investors, are the main reason for Manulife’s troublesome stock market exposure.) “My guarantee on that will compound 7 per cent this year,” said Mr. Devine. “As a percentage of its account value, that’s 11.2 per cent. The market’s down 10 per cent.”
Beyond its hedging programs, Manulife has been reducing risk by increasing prices and decreasing sales of riskier products, such as variable annuities. But while it has slashed the amount of variable annuities it sells in the U.S. by more than 75 per cent, it still must contend with products it sold at the height of the market.
Aside from parting ways with Hancock, another option for raising capital might be to sell Manulife Bank, Mr. Devine added.
If rates rebound (and, to a lesser degree, markets), many of Manulife’s problems could be erased, and the company would release some of its pent-up reserves back into profits. The company’s executives stress that Canadian accounting rules force insurers here to report more pain sooner as interest rates fall, whereas under U.S. rules, much of the impact is delayed.
Mr. Guloien recently told analysts that he remains committed to his goal of bringing the company’s profits up to $4-billion by 2015. It made nearly that much in 2006, Mr. Devine noted.

Silvercorp’s Rui Feng fires back


THE LUNCH

Silvercorp’s Rui Feng fires back

VANCOUVER— From Saturday's Globe and Mail
Rui Feng’s lawyers want him to keep quiet.
Even some of his still-loyal shareholders have urged the chief executive officer of Silvercorp Metals Inc. (SVM-T6.91-0.14-1.99%) to ignore anonymous short-seller allegations of wrongdoing and focus instead on the business of mining silver in China.
But he can’t help himself.
The allegations, which surfaced three weeks ago, have not only hurt Silvercorp’s reputation, but have hit Mr. Feng in the pocketbook. The stock has fallen by as much as 25 per cent, benefiting short sellers and stinging shareholders such as the CEO, who has a 2.4-per-cent stake in the Vancouver-based company.
What’s more, when Mr. Feng speaks, the stock bounces back. Take Friday, for example: Although Silvercorp shares closed down in Toronto as silver plunged for the second straight day, the stock jumped briefly after the company launched a multimillion-dollar lawsuit in the United States, demanding that various accusers remove what it alleges are “false, defamatory and fraudulent information” from their websites.
“Nobody will push me down,” says Mr. Feng, 48, over a lunch of halibut and tea this week at The Grill restaurant inside Vancouver’s Terminal City Club. Founded in 1892, the downtown members-only venue is dominated by silver-haired white men several years his senior and, as his voice grows louder, his intensity causes some members playing billiards nearby to stop and stare.
Mr. Feng also has a new weapon in his war against short sellers: a pair of bright red socks. They, too, are loud against his black suit, white buttoned-down dress shirt and black shoes. The socks are a gift from his secretary, who insisted this week he had to start wearing red for good luck, as is customary in Chinese culture. He says he plans to wear a pair of red socks, and a pair of red underwear, every day – at least until this battle is over.
Mr. Feng is no stranger to struggle or to the rough-and-tumble world of business. The PhD-educated geologist, who was raised in a military camp while his father served in the Chinese army, has had his share of setbacks. And, he says, he has been both cheated and blindsided a few times in his career.
In the beginning, there were private deals with people who didn’t pay. There was the embarrassment in early 2004, when Silvercorp was called SKN Resources Ltd. It publicly congratulated Southwestern Resources Corp. after it announced positive results from drill holes on its Boka Project in China, which it hoped to capitalize on at its Tuobuka property nearby. Boka would be exposed as a fraud a few years later, but not before Mr. Feng’s team drilled away at its own site and found nothing. Eventually, it pulled out and watched its share price plummet back to penny-stock status.
Silvercorp then quickly turned its attention to the Ying silver project, a “high-grade silver gold” endeavour in which it bought a majority stake from the Chinese government in April, 2004. After reaching full production two years later, Silvercorp quickly turned a quarterly loss of about $800,000 (U.S.) into a profit of $2.3-million a year later, according to its financial statements.
Mr. Feng has attributed his seemingly quick success at Ying in part to the mine’s tunnelling technique, which he says is a speedier process than drilling.
Today, Silvercorp and its flagship Ying mine is China’s largest primary silver producer, pumping out a record 5.3 million ounces of the metal in its last fiscal year ended March 31, and earning $68.8-million in profit on sales of $167.3-million – also records.
What’s more, the company’s shares hit an all-time high of $15.60 (Canadian) on the Toronto Stock Exchange in early April, around the time the price of silver peaked at about $49 an ounce (U.S.). But the celebration didn’t last long. In August, Mr. Feng said he started to notice strange movements in trading of his stock. “I knew something was happening,” he said, pouring more tea. The company was then told by one of its shareholders in mid-August that it had heard a report on Silvercorp was being prepared by short sellers.
The short position on the stock had started to build. Mr. Feng was in Beijing on Sept. 2, when he got a call saying that an anonymous letter alleging a “potential $1.3-billion accounting fraud” had been sent to the company, its auditors, regulators and some media. The company said it had to respond, insisting the allegations are bogus.
The stock tanked.
Then, just as the shares were starting to recover, a second anonymous group of short investors came forward with more accusations of wrongdoing in a report issued by a website called AlfredLittle.com, which describes its work as research on companies operating in China. The allegations against Silvercorp continued to trickle in, and the company continued to fight back through documents and by vigorously proclaiming its innocence to both the news media and investors.
“I never cheated nobody. That is very important,” Mr. Feng says.
Before his company became the target, Mr. Feng had been following other Chinese companies listed in North America that were being tagged by short sellers in their reports. He wasn’t as quick to blame short sellers back then. However, now that his is in the spotlight, Mr. Feng is claiming discrimination against companies that do business in his native country.
“I understand these people are trying to make money,” he says of the short sellers. “But now they say every Chinese company is a fraud? That’s not fair.”
Not only does Mr. Feng insist his company has done nothing wrong, he plans to fight the “short-and-distort industry” by demanding regulators start cracking down on the people behind it.
As part of its effort to show the company has nothing to hide, it commissioned a special committee to look into the allegations, with the help of KPMG Forensics, which is expected to put out an independent report any day now on the company’s books.
And if KMPG’s numbers turn out to be different than Silvercorp’s?
“They will not,” Mr. Feng shoots back.
“What if they do?” he is asked again.
“They won’t.”
CURRICULUM VITAE
Background:
Born in 1963 in Hubei province in central China.
Moved to Hunan province, where he was raised in a military camp while his father served in the Chinese army.
The eldest of three children.
Education:
Was among the first generation of students in China to enter university after the Cultural Revolution.
Earned a BSc, then a masters of geology in China.
Moved to Canada to pursue a PhD in geology from the University of Saskatchewan. Graduated in 1992.
Awarded a postdoctoral fellowship from the National Engineering and Science Council of Canada in April, 1992, to work as a research scientist at the University of Montreal.
From 1993 to 1994, worked as a research scientist for the Institute of Sedimentary and Petroleum Geology of the Geological Survey of Canada in Calgary.
Career:
After striking out on his own, made some mineral resources discoveries in China. These included those behind Jinshan Gold Mines Inc., which was later sold to Robert Friedland of Ivanhoe Mines in 2004. Ivanhoe sold its interest in Jinshan in 2008 for $216-million, for a gain of $201-million.
Personal:
Director of the B.C. chapter of the Canada China Business Council and vice-president of the Canada-China Business Association.
Began playing golf in 2008.
Enjoys reading history books
Married with two teenage children.